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Note 
 
No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Duties 
Held by Malware Researchers, Penetration 
Testers, and “White Hat” Hackers  
Jon Watkins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than five years ago, the National Security Agency 
(NSA) discovered a vulnerability1 in Windows’ implementation 
of SMBv12 and developed a tool, EternalBlue,3 to exploit that 
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 1.   
A “vulnerability” is an occurrence of a weakness (or multiple 
weaknesses) within software, in which the weakness can be used by a 
party to cause the software to modify or access unintended data, 
interrupt proper execution, or perform incorrect actions that were not 
specifically granted to the party who uses the weakness. 
CYBERSEC. UNIT, U.S. DEP’T JUST., A FRAMEWORK FOR A VULNERABILITY 
DISCLOSURE PROGRAM FOR ONLINE SYSTEMS 1 n.2 (2017). 
 2.  
Server Message Block (SMB) is the file protocol most commonly used 
by Windows. SMB Signing is a feature through which communications 
using SMB can be digitally signed at the packet level. Digitally signing 
the packets enables the recipient of the packets to confirm their point 
of origination and their authenticity. This security mechanism in the 
SMB protocol helps avoid issues like tampering of packets and “man 
in the middle” attacks. 
Jose Barreto, The Basics of SMB Signing, MICROSOFT TECHNET (Dec. 1, 2010), 
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/josebda/2010/12/01/the-basics-of-smb-
signing-covering-both-smb1-and-smb2/. 
 3. Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg, NSA Officials Worried About the 
Day Its Potent Hacking Tool Would Get Loose. Then It Did, WASH. POST (May 
16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/nsa-officials-
worried-about-the-day-its-potent-hacking-tool-would-get-loose-then-it-
did/2017/05/16/50670b16-3978-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html. 
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vulnerability. The NSA used EternalBlue to surveil numerous 
targets with great success: as one former NSA employee said, 
using EternalBlue was “like fishing with dynamite.”4 Despite 
the NSA’s awareness of EternalBlue’s potency, the NSA 
withheld information about the underlying security 
vulnerability from Microsoft for years, perhaps fearing that the 
subsequent patch would destroy one of the NSA’s most potent 
tools.5 
The consequences of the decision to withhold this 
information became evident on April 14, 2017, when a group 
calling themselves Shadow Brokers released a massive trove of 
stolen NSA cyberweapons, including EternalBlue, to the public.6 
Initial reporting on the release focused heavily on EternalBlue 
and other vulnerabilities which appeared to be zero-day exploits7 
to which every Microsoft computer on the planet would be 
vulnerable.8 This apocalyptic scenario—an uncontrolled 
cyberweapon capable of infiltrating the vast majority of 
computers on the planet9—turned out not to be the case, as 
Microsoft had released a security patch a month earlier,10 but 
what actually happened is far from acceptable. 
                                                          
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Dan Goodin, NSA-Leaking Shadow Brokers Just Dumped Its Most 
Damaging Release Yet, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:27 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/nsa-leaking-shadow-
brokers-just-dumped-its-most-damaging-release-yet/. 
 7. See Tony Bradley, Zero Day Exploits, LIFEWIRE (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.lifewire.com/zero-day-exploits-2487435 (“A zero day exploit is 
when the exploit for the vulnerability is created before, or on the same day as 
the vulnerability is learned about by the vendor.”). 
 8. Id.; see also Nicholas Weaver, Shadow Brokers Redux: Dump of NSA 
Tools Gets Even Worse, LAWFARE (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:31 PM), https:// 
lawfareblog.com/shadow-brokers-redux-dump-nsa-tools-gets-even-worse. 
 9. Nicholas Weaver’s response to the April 14 Shadow Brokers dump is 
representative of the attitude of many security professionals prior to learning 
the SMB vulnerability exploited by EternalBlue had been patched by Microsoft: 
“It really is a good weekend to turn off your computer.” Weaver, supra note 8. 
The prospect of an unleashed cyberweapon so potent and so unexpected that 
the only safe response for even the information-security literate is to turn one’s 
computer off—and leave it off until a patch is available—should rightly be 
considered terrifying. 
 10. Brad Smith, The Need for Urgent Collective Action to Keep People Safe 
Online: Lessons from Last Week’s Cyberattack, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT ON THE 
ISSUES (May 14, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14 
/need-urgent-collective-action-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-
cyberattack/; see also Goodin, supra note 6; Weaver, supra note 8. 
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On May 12, 2017, less than a month after EternalBlue was 
publicly released, EternalBlue was used as a means of spreading 
Wannacry, the now-infamous malware that locked computers in 
150 countries,11 caused up to $4 billion in losses,12 and crippled 
the UK’s National Health Service (NHS).13 Even though 
EternalBlue was by this point in time harmless to Windows 
computers as long as the owner had applied the security patch 
released two months earlier,14 immense numbers of computers 
remained unpatched, and were therefore vulnerable.15 
EternalBlue and Wannacry represent a unique set of 
problems at the intersection of cybersecurity and law: did the 
NSA have a responsibility to disclose the underlying SMB 
vulnerability to Microsoft? Would the discoverer of that 
vulnerability have had the same responsibility if it were not the 
NSA, but instead a civilian, or a company which competes with 
Microsoft? If any of these parties had such a responsibility, did 
it arise when the vulnerability was first discovered? When 
EternalBlue was stolen? Shadow Brokers are frequently 
portrayed as a malicious actor in the story of Wannacry, but 
what is it that makes their actions malicious? Is it because they 
stole tools from the NSA? Is it because they allegedly released 
zero-days and cyberweapons to the public? Is it because they did 
not contact Microsoft in advance of the public release? Is it 
something else entirely? 
These questions are important, and many of them have no 
sufficient answer or analogy in existing law. This Note will 
attempt to address some of them, although addressing all of 
them would be an immense undertaking which is outside the 
scope of this Note. After addressing these questions and other 
critical issues brought up by the current state of vulnerability 
research and malware development, this Note concludes that 
individuals who develop malware or discover software 
vulnerabilities must be held to prevailing standards of 
                                                          
 11. Jonathan Berr, “WannaCry” Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach 
$4 Billion, CBS: MONEYWATCH (May 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www 
.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Owen Hughes, WannaCry Impact on NHS Considerably Larger than 
Previously Suggested, DIGITAL HEALTH (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www 
.digitalhealth.net/2017/10/wannacry-impact-on-nhs-considerably-larger-than-
previously-suggested/. 
 14. Smith, supra note 10. 
 15. Id. 
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disclosure, which must be developed and revised in cooperation 
with a variety of stakeholders. The currently prevailing 
standards, including Responsible Disclosure, are detailed at 
length below. When individuals violate their duties as laid out 
by these standards, they should be held civilly, or in rare cases 
criminally, liable for their actions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT ARE VULNERABILITIES, AND WHY DO THEY MATTER? 
Software can be very difficult to design. The software behind 
a commonly used website or application can include anywhere 
from ten thousand to ten million lines of code, and all of Google’s 
Internet Service code combined amounts to over 2 billion lines of 
code.16 While the ideal world may include software without 
vulnerabilities, the sheer scale of much software means such a 
world is not quite within our reach.17 Various groups have 
drastically differing approaches to vulnerabilities. Government 
actors like the NSA have an established practice of stockpiling 
vulnerabilities rather than helping vendors remedy them.18 This 
approach is highly effective at achieving national security 
                                                          
 16. Codebases, INF. IS BEAUTIFUL (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/million-lines-of-code/. 
 17. Marian K. Riedy & Bartlomiej Hanus, It Is Just Unfair Using Trade 
Laws to “Out” Security Software Vulnerabilities, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1099, 1099 
(2017) (“All but the simplest software contains some vulnerabilities, including 
coding errors.”). 
 18. Russell Brandom, After Shadow Brokers, Should the NSA Still Be 
Hoarding Vulnerabilities?, VERGE (Aug. 19, 2016, 9:53 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/8/19/12548462/shadow-brokers-nsa-
vulnerability-disclosure-zero-day. But see THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON 
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 219 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files 
/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf (advocating for an end to the NSA 
stockpiling policy, and arguing the NSA should aid vendors in patching 
vulnerabilities). 
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objectives19 and at committing lucrative cybercrime,20 but is not 
effective at protecting individual consumers or companies.21 
Additionally, the line between vulnerabilities and malware 
may be very thin: a demonstration of a vulnerability sufficient 
to either sell that vulnerability or publicly disclose it generally 
includes a proof of concept, and a proof of concept is, in turn, 
typically very close in form to an exploit, which would be salable 
as malware.22 For this reason, “malware” and “vulnerability” 
will be used more or less interchangeably in this paper. While 
they are conceptually different for programming purposes, this 
difference has a negligible effect on how each should be disclosed 
to the public.23 
                                                          
 19. Mailyn Fidler, Anarchy or Regulation: Controlling the Global Trade in 
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 11 (May 2014) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Stanford 
University) (on file with Stanford University), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file 
/druid:zs241cm7504/Zero-Day%20Vulnerability%20Thesis%20by 
%20Fidler.pdf (“The inclusion of zero-days in Stuxnet demonstrates their high 
value to the U.S. government for offensive cyber operations.”). 
 20. Leyla Bilge & Tudor Dumitras, Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study 
of Zero-Day Attacks in the Real World, 19 ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMMS. 
SECURITY 833, 833 (2012), https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public 
_documents/bilge12_zero_day.pdf (“For cyber criminals, unpatched 
vulnerabilities in popular software, such as Microsoft Office or Adobe Flash, 
represent a free pass to any target they might wish to attack, from Fortune 500 
companies to millions of consumer PCs around the world.”). 
 21. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a 
Legitimate, Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software 
Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 793 (2016) (“[E]very zero day that is 
secretly used by a government is one more zero day that can be used against 
that government’s law-abiding citizens, either by that government or by 
someone else.”). 
 22. Id. at 802 (“Vulnerability sales often require proof of concept, in which 
case the seller will have to build a working exploit. At that time, the seller is 
faced with another choice because he or she now has the start of a product, the 
exploit, which could demand a high price on the black market.”). 
 23. Generally, the tech world uses “vulnerability” to refer to security flaws 
in systems, and “malware” or “exploit” to refer to intentional exploitation of that 
flaw. Id. at 759. Despite that important technical distinction, this paper focuses 
mostly on the disclosure duty and other duties held by various parties, and 
those duties rarely change due to this distinction. The distinction may be an 
especially critical distinction in a negligence lawsuit focusing on causation, for 
instance, but discussing vulnerabilities and malware separately in this paper 
would result in substantial redundancy. Finally, this Note is not entirely alone 
in opting to give less weight to this distinction in the context of duty. Clause 7.2 
of ISO/IEC 29147, for example, states that while proofs of concept are sensitive 
information, vendors have a general duty to provide a secure means to submit 
all vulnerability reports, whether or not they include a proof of concept in 
addition to information about the vulnerability. INT’L ORG. FOR 
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Tech companies have a vested interest in producing secure 
software, and fixing vulnerabilities in their software as soon as 
possible. While many tech companies run bug bounty programs 
which pay large amounts of money to third parties who find and 
disclose vulnerabilities in the company’s code,24 these sums of 
money may be dwarfed by the amount the vulnerability could 
fetch on the black market,25 and some tech companies have a 
practice of suing researchers who discover vulnerabilities in 
their software—a practice which may heavily discourage 
disclosure.26 Some researchers may also opt to publicly disclose 
the vulnerability, with or without the cooperation of the software 
vendor.27 The decision to publicly disclose a vulnerability often 
comes with substantial risks.28 Despite these risks, public 
disclosure is very popular, possibly because, as Kesan and Hayes 
note: “Reputation is practically a currency in the information 
security field. Being known as the person who discovered a major 
security flaw might prove as valuable as being paid in legal 
                                                          
STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM., VULNERABILITY 
DISCLOSURE: ISO/IEC 29147 § 7.2 (2014). 
 24. See, e.g., Chrome Reward Program Rules, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/chrome-rewards/ (last visited Apr. 
14, 2018) (“Rewards for qualifying bugs typically range from $500 to $100,000. 
We have a standing $100,000 reward for participants that can compromise a 
Chromebook or Chromebox with device persistence in guest mode.”). 
 25. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 761 (“Unfortunately, bug bounties 
are often just a fraction of what the researcher could earn if he or she sold the 
information to someone else.”); Robert Hackett, Jailbreaks Wanted: $1 Million 
Dollar iPhone Hacks, FORTUNE (Sept. 21, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/21 
/ios9-million-dollar-hack/ (“The cybersecurity firm Zerodium announced on 
Monday that it will reward $1 million to anyone able to crack Apple’s recently 
launched iOS 9 operating system, which the startup’s website claims is ‘the 
world’s most secure mobile OS.’”). 
 26. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 789. For a more recent example, see 
Zack Whittaker (@zackwhittaker), TWITTER (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:06 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/zackwhittaker/status/976611110223835137, which describes a 
recent lawsuit brought by a tech company against security researchers and a 
news website regarding technicalities in the disclosure of a security 
vulnerability in the tech company’s product. 
 27. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 793–94. 
 28. Compare Bilge & Dumitras, supra note 20, at 2 (“After zero-day 
vulnerabilities are disclosed, the number of malware variants exploiting them 
increases 183–85,000 times and the number of attacks increases 2–100,000 
times.”), with Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 793 (“Zero days are valuable on 
the open market . . . as long as they remain unknown to others . . . . This aspect 
of zero days may be one reason why many security researchers prefer to publicly 
disclose vulnerabilities. By shedding light on the vulnerability, the value of the 
vulnerability to malicious actors plummets.”). 
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currency.”29 For this reason, safeguards on disclosure are 
sometimes cast aside in the pursuit of recognition.30 There are, 
of course, non-fame-related reasons to publicly disclose a 
vulnerability,31 but these justifications may not be empirically 
sound.32 
This point brings us to the central questions of this paper—
what are the specific legal duties of cybersecurity professionals 
with regards to disclosure? What safeguards need to exist to 
ensure proper disclosure, and to ensure that vulnerabilities are 
handled properly? How can any given system differentiate 
between malicious, benign, and beneficial actors, and should 
                                                          
 29. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 794. Some infrastructure does exist 
for providing the types of reward and recognition which may well be currency 
to a security researcher, and often couples that reward with actual currency. 
This infrastructure includes BugCrowd and HackerOne, both of which are 
recommended by I Am The Cavalry. BugCrowd, BUGCROWD, https://www 
.bugcrowd.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018); HackerOne, HACKERONE, 
https://www.hackerone.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018); I Am the Cavalry 
Position on Disclosure, I AM THE CAVALRY (June 25, 2014), https://www 
.iamthecavalry.org/about/disclosure/. Other bug bounty programs, including 
Google’s, also personally name researchers who discover certain classes of 
vulnerabilities—providing another avenue for the desired recognition. See, e.g., 
Chrome Reward Program Rules, supra note 24. 
 30. An example may help to illustrate this point. Recently, a security 
researcher allegedly discovered a possibly enormous vulnerability—
unauthorized root access—within Mac OS X Sierra, and published the 
vulnerability on Twitter, apparently without contacting Apple first. Lemi 
Orhan Ergin (@lemiorhan), TWITTER (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:38 PM), 
https://twitter.com/lemiorhan/status/935578694541770752 (“Anyone can login 
as ‘root’ with empty password after clicking on login button several times.”). 
One account’s response was representative of widespread condemnation of this 
disclosure: “QA failures notwithstanding: there’s no need to set an entire street 
afire in order to point out that the kitchen in one house is burning.” Blacklight 
(@blacklightpix), TWITTER (Nov. 28, 2017, 2:46 PM), https://twitter.com 
/blacklightpix/status/935641138987286528. 
 31. Google Security Team, Rebooting Responsible Disclosure: A Focus on 
Protecting End Users, GOOGLE SEC. BLOG (July 20, 2010), 
https://security.googleblog.com/2010/07/rebooting-responsible-disclosure-
focus.html (“[T]he argument for full disclosure proceeds: because a given bug 
may be under active exploitation, full disclosure enables immediate 
preventative action, and pressures vendors for fast fixes. Speedy fixes, in turn, 
make users safer by reducing the number of vulnerabilities available to 
attackers at any given time.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Bilge & Dumitras, supra note 20 (“After zero-day 
vulnerabilities are disclosed, the number of malware variants exploiting them 
increases 183–85,000 times and the number of attacks increases 2–100,000 
times.”); Google Security Team, supra note 31 (“We understand that not all bugs 
can be fixed in 60 days, although many can and should be.”). 
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such a differentiation change the duties that attach to any given 
actor?33 Questions of duty and liability are especially important 
in the cybersecurity context, because as Kesan and Hayes note: 
“systems are particularly prone to failure when the person 
guarding them is not the person who suffers when they fail.”34 
In other words, consumer information may only be secure when 
the corporations keeping that information in a vault, and the 
hackers holding the keys to that vault, are both subject to 
liability when something goes wrong. Under standard theories 
of negligence, this liability can only arise where a standard of 
care or duty exists.35 
B. WHAT DUTIES ARISE IN SIMILAR CONTEXTS? 
A general duty to behave in a manner which is not 
unreasonably dangerous attaches to nearly everyone, nearly all 
the time.36 There is no general duty to prevent harm caused by 
the criminal acts of others,37 but such a duty can arise due to 
certain relationships or in certain contexts—for example, the 
duty to protect one’s patients can be strong enough to overcome 
even therapist/client privilege.38 This duty to safeguard, and 
other duties to prevent harm to third parties, are limited by 
intervening causes.39 Intervening causes do not always sever 
liability, especially where the harm caused by the intervention 
was reasonably foreseeable.40 However, when considering cases 
                                                          
 33. For a complex discussion of the types of individuals involved in malware 
research, hacking, and related fields, see Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 769 
(adapting the Dungeons and Dragons Morality/Ethics framework to 
cybersecurity). 
 34. Id. at 780 (quoting Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of 
Information Security, 314 SCI., Oct. 27, 2006, at 610). 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 36. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) 
(quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp, 525 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1974)) (“As 
a general principle, a ‘defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are 
foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the 
conduct unreasonably dangerous.’”). 
 37. Bridges v. Parrish, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (N.C. 2013). 
 38. Tarasoff, 525 P.2d at 345. 
 39. Kush v. City of Buffalo, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729 (N.Y. 1983). 
 40.  
[A]n intervening intentional or criminal act will generally sever the 
liability of the original tort-feasor, but, on the facts here, [Defendant] 
may not rely on this doctrine. 
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involving less foreseeable acts, which may include criminal acts, 
courts may be more likely to find that an intervening cause does 
sever liability.41 
Specifically considering the disclosure of dangerous 
information, restrictions on disclosure have been established in 
disciplines other than cybersecurity, and are often premised on 
the logic that certain information is too dangerous to be disclosed 
publicly. One example is the 2011 H5N1 (avian flu) publication 
debate, which resulted in publication,42 but also in an 
                                                          
 That doctrine has no application when the intentional or criminal 
intervention of a third party or parties is reasonably foreseeable . . . . 
When the intervening, intentional act of another is itself the foreseeable 
harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defendant who fails to guard 
against such conduct will not be relieved of liability when that act 
occurs. 
Id. (holding that a city was not freed of liability under intervening cause 
doctrine where chemicals were insufficiently stored at a school, a child 
subsequently lit the chemicals on fire, and was injured); see also Herrera v. 
Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 194 (N.M. 2003) (finding that leaving a key in the 
ignition of an unattended, unlocked car in a high-crime area owes a duty of 
ordinary care to individuals injured in an auto accident when a thief steals the 
car, even where the auto accident was criminally caused by the thief, because 
the theft and accident were foreseeable). 
 41. See Wilken v. City of Lexington, 754 N.W.2d 616, 621–24 (Neb. Ct. App. 
2008) (holding that an intervening cause severed liability where a police officer 
had left an unrestrained prisoner and a loaded shotgun in his running vehicle, 
and the prisoner subsequently shot the plaintiffs with said shotgun); Johnstone 
v. City of Albuquerque, 145 P.3d 76, 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a 
stepfather was not liable for juvenile’s suicide where said suicide was not 
foreseeable, despite the stepfather’s failure to significantly safeguard his gun). 
 42. Michael J. Imperiale & Arturo Casadevall, A New Synthesis for Dual 
Use Research of Concern, PLOS MED., Apr. 14, 2015, at 2, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4397073/pdf/pmed.1001813.pd
f (describing the debate over publication of the Kawaoka and Fouchier papers, 
which described how a strain of avian influenza could be made transmissible by 
air). Due to concerns that the contents of certain research papers could be used 
for bioterror, many members of the scientific community, as well as the U.S. 
Government, became involved in a protracted debate about whether or not the 
papers could be published, and if so, whether the papers could be redacted. Id. 
NSABB (the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity) recommended 
that the portion of the paper consisting essentially of “instructions” should not 
be published, although the end results of the research were sufficiently 
significant to merit publication. Id. This finding was supported by the dominant 
calculus for publication review in this context—the Dual Use Research of 
Concern (DURC) Policy, originally published in 2007. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. 
FOR BIOSEC., PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE LIFE 
SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF 
RESEARCH INFORMATION 15 (2007). NSABB’s position was contradicted by the 
U.S. Government, which forced NSABB to vote on either full publication or no 
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extensively considered grant of power to the U.S. government to 
restrict publication of Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC), as 
well as a straightforward calculus for when publication should 
be restricted.43 As another example, nuclear weapons are not 
patentable,44 primarily because nuclear weapons are too 
dangerous to be publicly disclosed as the U.S. patent system 
requires.45 However, most analogous restrictions on disclosure 
outside of those tied to privilege law46 use existing oversight 
mechanisms such as the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) or 
the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), 
instead of imposing a legal duty on the individual holding the 
sensitive information.47 
Finally, deviating slightly from the discussion of duty, 
existing strict liability torts merit some consideration here. 
Generally speaking, “abnormally dangerous activities” are 
subject to strict liability rather than a conventional negligence 
analysis—examples of such activities include certain illegal 
                                                          
publication—the papers were eventually published in full. Imperiale & 
Casadevall, supra, at 2. 
 43. See Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42, at 3. “[Federal Agencies 
may] [r]equest voluntary redaction of the research publications or 
communications[;][c]lassify the research, in accordance with National Security 
Decision Directive/NSDD-189[; or] [n]ot provide or terminate research funding.” 
Franca R. Jones, Dual Use Research of Concern: The March 29 Policy, NAT’L 
SCI. ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY (Nov. 27, 2012), 
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/NSABB_Meeting_Jones 
_March_29_Policy_slides%20(1).pdf (emphasis in original). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2012). Note, however, § 2181(a): “No patent shall 
hereinafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely 
in . . . an atomic weapon.” Id. (emphasis added). “Solely” invites a comparison 
to dual-use research as described in note 42, as it implies that nuclear-related 
patents which have a second use are not necessarily excluded under that 
provision. Even though § 2181(a) predates the DURC policy by 71 years, it 
implies the same policy foundation: there should be a presumption of disclosure 
where some public benefit inheres in certain information, even if malicious 
actors could misuse that information. 
 45. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY 206–07 (7th. ed. 2017). 
 46. See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 347 
(1976) (“We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the 
confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to 
the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The 
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.”); see also Upjohn Co. v. 
U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”) (citing 
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
 47. E.g. Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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fireworks displays and the transportation of explosive 
material.48 Under such an analysis, whether the defendant 
exercised a reasonable standard of care is irrelevant. The 
Restatement definition of “abnormally dangerous” is critical in 
such cases—it applies strict liability only to activities which are 
uncommon, and which “[create] a foreseeable and highly 
significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is 
exercised by all actors.”49 As will be discussed below, there is a 
colorable argument that vulnerability and malware research is 
abnormally dangerous, which would render the strict liability 
analysis highly relevant. 
C. WHAT DUTIES ARISE DUE TO CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 
AND INDUSTRY NORMS? 
The U.S. government has attempted to bring clarity to 
cybersecurity law in recent years. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) recently provided voluntary 
cybersecurity standards,50 but said standards only infrequently 
mention disclosure or the proper means of handling 
vulnerabilities and malware. The Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act (CISA)51 permits voluntary sharing of “cyber threat 
indicators and defensive measures,”52 and provides a shield from 
antitrust liability where cybersecurity information is shared 
between private entities for cybersecurity purposes,53 but 
providing a shield for certain voluntary conduct does not 
necessarily establish a duty to perform that conduct, and CISA 
was also mostly targeted at large companies, rather than 
individual researchers or small groups of researchers.54 
                                                          
 48. See, e.g., JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON & DOUGLAS 
A. KYSAR, THE TORTS PROCESS 464 (8th ed. 2012). 
 49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Notably, there are other ways in which strict 
liability can be applied to a certain situation, including, for example, possessing 
exotic or dangerous pets. Id., §§ 22–23. Other situations in which strict liability 
applies are, however, outside the scope of this paper. 
 50. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default 
/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf. 
 51. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (Supp. 2016). 
 52. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 773. 
 53. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(e) (Supp. 2012). 
 54. See Eric Geller, Your Complete Guide to CISA, the Cybersecurity Bill 
Scaring Privacy Activists, DAILY DOT (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:38 AM), https://www 
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Furthermore, the mere existence of voluntary standards has 
been criticized,55 which calls the standards stated in both the 
CISA and the NIST into question. Further cybersecurity 
legislation has been discussed which would more directly deal 
with vulnerability and malware disclosure through treating 
malware as a weapon subject to arms control,56 but its future is 
uncertain. Additionally, similar to the DURC discussion in the 
context of H5N1 above, many cybersecurity tools (including 
some encryption technologies) are considered dual-use goods 
under the Wassenaar Agreement, an international “voluntary 
export control regime,” but the Agreement has little controlling 
force, as it is not technically a treaty.57 Finally, for a discussion 
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), see Part D below. 
In addition to the legislation discussed above, discussions 
surrounding industry norms58 for vulnerability and malware 
disclosure abound. Kesan and Hayes note that public disclosures 
of vulnerabilities are commonly made at industry conferences, 
and that “[t]he current prevailing norm is to work with the 
vendor ahead of time to ensure that the vulnerability is patched 
before the presentation.”59 However, substantial debate exists 
regarding precisely how much notice is appropriate, and 
whether researchers may publicly disclose vulnerabilities at 
                                                          
.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-cisa-2015-s754-cybersecurity-information-
sharing-act/. 
 55. E.g., Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 776 (“Some critics question the 
wisdom of even voluntary cybersecurity standards, due to the risk that 
companies will adopt the bare minimum required to comply. Providing a higher 
baseline than what might have existed before is valuable, but the danger comes 
when agencies mistake practices that are necessary to improve security, and 
practices that are sufficient to improve security.”). 
 56. See, e.g., John Reed, The U.S. Senate Wants to Control Malware Like 
It’s a Missile, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 27, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://foreignpolicy 
.com/2013/06/27/the-u-s-senate-wants-to-control-malware-like-its-a-missile/ 
(describing one such bill). 
 57. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 777. The Wassenaar Agreement, 
which is essentially aimed at harmonizing export controls on conventional 
weapons and DURC technology (see section B, supra, for a more in-depth 
discussion of DURC), has been viewed as a tool for controlling the zero-day 
vulnerability market. See Fidler, supra note 19, at 135. 
 58. The benefits of using industry norms to determine the direction of 
cybersecurity law are substantial. See Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer 
Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (2016) (comparing judicial analysis in 
the realm of virtual trespass to that of a “Martian from outer space,” and 
asserting that “[w]ithout established norms to rely on, the application of a 
seemingly simple concept like ‘authorization’ becomes surprisingly hard”). 
 59. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 794. 
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conferences to pressure a vendor to patch a vulnerability, where 
researchers believe the vendor has unduly delayed the patch.60 
Additionally, lively debate exists regarding the ethics of any sort 
of public disclosure,61 and researchers who rely on being able to 
monetize their discoveries may find themselves disappointed by 
the size of the bug bounty they may or may not receive from a 
vendor, in the context of the payments they could receive on the 
grey or black market from a government or other entity who 
would effectively pay the researcher not to publicly disclose the 
vulnerability.62 
For researchers who are less interested in their bank 
accounts, Responsible Disclosure63 is an appealing model, which 
essentially requires that researchers give vendors a certain 
period of prior warning before they release information about a 
vulnerability publicly. Some Responsible Disclosure models rely 
on cooperation with trusted third parties to delay disclosure by 
a reasonable time frame.64 Nearly all Responsible Disclosure 
models allow for the date of public disclosure to be adjusted 
based on the severity of the vulnerability, as well as the needs of 
both the vendor and the researcher.65 A number of parties have 
extensively advocated for Responsible Disclosure and attempted 
to provide incentives for researchers to participate,66 but 
concerns about appropriate compensation persist, especially 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 793–94. 
 61. See id. at 794–95 (“Disclosure is thus a double-edged sword, increasing 
the likelihood of attacks while simultaneously supporting improvements in 
security.”); Bilge & Dumitras, supra note 20, at 842 (“[T]he participants to the 
debate disagree about whether trading off a high volume of attacks for faster 
patching provides an overall benefit to the society.”). 
 62. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 761 (“Unfortunately, bug bounties 
are often just a fraction of what the researcher could earn if he or she sold the 
information to someone else.”). 
 63. See Douglas Bonderud, The Responsible Disclosure Policy: Safeguard or 
Cybercriminal Siren Song?, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 26, 2014), 
https://securityintelligence.com/the-responsible-disclosure-policy-safeguard-or-
cybercriminal-siren-song/. 
 64. E.g. US-CERT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INFO SHEET, https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/infosheet_US-CERT_v2.pdf (“To protect 
America’s cyberspace, US-CERT . . . [a]cts as a trusted third-party to assist in 
the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities.”). 
 65. Google Security Team, supra note 31. 
 66. E.g. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, 803 (citing Derek E. Bambauer & 
Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1086 (2011)) (“Bambauer 
and Day, for example, recommend granting researchers immunity from 
intellectual property litigation if they follow a responsible disclosure model.”). 
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where the researcher discovers a vulnerability in the software of 
a vendor who does not offer bug bounties.67 Proposals like 
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) are highly similar 
to Responsible Disclosure, and have much the same effect.68 
Some authors have focused their proposals away from 
researchers, and toward vendors. Recent litigation has sparked 
some discussion of a duty to safeguard in the cybersecurity 
context, although the cases to date have mainly focused on the 
duty of companies to safeguard personally identifiable 
information,69 and the extent to which intervening causes sever 
liability related to that duty.70 Some authors have also argued 
that vendors have a duty to write safe and vulnerability-free 
code,71 although this duty seems practically impossible to 
                                                          
 67. Many companies’ responsible disclosure policies expressly foreclose the 
possibility of any compensation at all, and some explicitly threaten a lawsuit 
will follow a request for compensation. E.g., Tricentis Flood Security, FLOOD BY 
TRICENTIS, https://flood.io/security (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“Tricentis 
reserves all of its legal rights in the event of any noncompliance . . . Requests 
for monetary compensation in connection with any identified or alleged 
vulnerability will be deemed noncompliant with this Responsible Disclosure 
Policy.”). See generally Fahmida Y. Rashid, Facebook Joins Google, Mozilla, 
Barracuda in Paying Bug Bounties, EWEEK (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.eweek 
.com/blogs/security-watch/facebook-joins-google-mozilla-barracuda-in-paying-
bug-bounties. 
 68. See, e.g., Chris Betz, A Call for Better Coordinated Vulnerability 
Disclosure, MICROSOFT TECHNET (Jan. 11, 2015), https://blogs.technet 
.microsoft.com/msrc/2015/01/11/a-call-for-better-coordinated-vulnerability-
disclosure/. 
 69. See, e.g., In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litig., No. 
16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL 3727318, at *27 (“The crux of Plaintiffs’ 
allegations is not that Defendants safeguards failed to be ‘100% secure.’ Rather, 
the crux of Plaintiffs’ allegations is that Defendants’ safeguards did not comply 
with applicable laws and regulations and that Defendants’ data encryption 
protocol was ‘widely discredited and had been proven, many years prior, easy to 
break.’”). 
 70. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)) (“If the 
likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or 
one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act[,] whether 
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal[,] does not prevent the 
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.”). 
 71. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The 
Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital 
Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109, 137 (2010); Paul N. Stockton & Michele Golabek-
Goldman, Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 
251–52 (2013). 
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fulfill.72 Additionally, both the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) vulnerability disclosure standard73 and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) vulnerability disclosure 
framework74 focus heavily on vendors, while the ISO standard 
explicitly excludes researchers, and the DOJ framework largely 
fails to assign them duty.75 
Finally, it should be noted that the U.S. government is 
frequently the party responsible for researching and managing 
vulnerabilities, and substantial debate exists regarding various 
proposals to limit the US government’s ability to stockpile 
vulnerabilities.76 While sovereign immunity and related 
doctrines are outside the scope of this Note, it should be 
mentioned that many proposals have been put forward 
regarding limiting the ability of the U.S. government to retain 
vulnerabilities,77 although many authors doubt the U.S. 
government is likely to ever give up the ability to use and 
stockpile cyberweapons.78 These national security implications 
                                                          
 72. See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 17 (“All but the simplest software 
contains some vulnerabilities, including coding errors.”). 
 73. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM., 
supra note 23, at v. 
 74. CYBERSEC. UNIT, U.S. DEP’T JUST., supra note 1, at 1. 
 75. While the DOJ Framework does point out that one incentive to create 
a vulnerability disclosure program is reducing the possibility of inadvertent 
violations of the CFAA, this portion of the Framework does not create any new 
duties, nor does it really interpret existing duties under the CFAA. Id. at 1–2, 
1 n.3. Instead, it aims to aid organizations in clarifying what access is 
“authorized” and what is not, since “exceeding authorized access” may result in 
a CFAA violation. Id. at 1–2. 
 76. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10 (“[W]e called in February for a new 
‘Digital Geneva Convention’ to govern these issues, including a new 
requirement for governments to report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than 
stockpile, sell, or exploit them.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 8 (“This dump also provides significant 
ammunition for those concerned with the [U.S.] government developing and 
keeping 0-day exploits. Like both previous Shadow Brokers dumps, this batch 
contains vulnerabilities that the NSA clearly did not disclose even after the 
tools were stolen. This means either that the NSA can’t determine which tools 
were stolen—a troubling possibility post-Snowden—or that the NSA was aware 
of the breach but failed to disclose to vendors despite knowing an adversary had 
access. I’m comfortable with the NSA keeping as many 0-days affecting U.S. 
systems as they want, so long as they are NOBUS (Nobody But Us). Once the 
NSA is aware an adversary knows of the vulnerabilities, the agency has an 
obligation to protect U.S. interests through disclosure.”). 
 78. See David E. Sanger, Nations Seek the Elusive Cure for Cyberattacks, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/01/21 
/business/davos-international-cyberattack-prevention.html (“The United 
550 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
complicate analyses of the WannaCry/Shadow Brokers fact 
pattern which introduced this Note—while under ordinary 
principles, a duty may have existed for any private company to 
share this information with Microsoft, the need for effective 
national security tools may be a sufficiently strong 
countervailing interest to justify the NSA’s sustained failure to 
inform Microsoft of the SMB vulnerability exploited by 
EternalBlue.79 
D. WHAT CRIMINAL LAWS APPLY TO MALWARE RESEARCHERS? 
The primary U.S. criminal law involving hacking is the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),80 which may have been 
enacted partially in response to War Games, a 1983 Cold War-
themed movie about hackers.81 Generally speaking, “the CFAA 
criminalized exceeding authorized access to a protected 
computer system.”82 The CFAA has been unevenly applied83 and 
roundly criticized,84 but remains highly significant in this field 
and in others.85 Recent litigation involving the CFAA has drawn 
                                                          
States, for example, would never support rules that banned espionage . . . . It is 
a power that the United States and its allies, have no intention of giving up.”). 
 79. For more in-depth discussion of the national security implications 
posed by NSA cyberweapon stockpiles, see Weaver, supra note 8, and Sanger, 
supra note 78. 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); see Cassandra Kirsch, The Grey Hat Hacker: 
Reconciling Cyberspace Reality and the Law, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 383, 392 (2014). 
 81. See Kirsch, supra note 80. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 771 (“[S]ome question the 
government’s enforcement patterns. A majority of referred CFAA cases are left 
unprosecuted due to lack of evidence, while CFAA prosecutions that do go 
forward sometimes play fast and loose with what it means to access a computer 
without authorization.”). 
 84. See Kirsch, supra note 80, at 392–93 (“[A]ll hacking is essentially illegal 
under the [CFAA] . . . . the CFAA has become so broad that the law now 
‘threatens to swallow the Internet.’ . . . . The broad language of the CFAA is a 
result of out-dated Internet philosophies from before the Internet’s 
omnipresence in society.”); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 771 
(“[I]nconsistent applications of [CFAA] threaten to discourage benevolent 
security research while encouraging the actions of malicious hackers who know 
that their odds of being caught and prosecuted are slim.”); Fidler, supra note 
19, at 68 (“The CFAA has been criticized for its ‘breadth and severity.’ The law 
has increasingly been used to prosecute offenses . . . . one might not consider 
classical hacking.”). 
 85. WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 472 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2016) (“[T]he use of the CFAA has evolved and a 
large proportion of current litigation under the law—both criminal and civil—
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substantial ire from the security community,86 but in the context 
of vulnerability disclosure, at least one court has remarked that 
merely publicly disclosing a vulnerability is not a CFAA 
violation,87 in a case that attracted significant attention among 
security researchers and computer scientists.88 The DOJ 
recently publicized guidelines on CFAA prosecution,89 which 
shed light on the Department’s thought process with regard to 
the modern applicability of the CFAA: for the most part, the 
Department is interested in prosecuting cases in which sensitive 
information was accessed, or a “pillar of society,” such as public 
health or major infrastructure, is threatened by the access.90 
Finally, since virtually any crime can be committed online,91 
crimes as serious as homicide may be committed as well. Given 
the breadth of the CFAA as discussed above, and at least one 
                                                          
now involves the misappropriation of confidential business information or trade 
secrets.”). 
 86. Kirsch, supra note 80, at 386–87 (discussing the facts of U.S. v. 
Auernheimer, as well as the response to the verdict, which was “heavily 
criticized by security professionals” as making “the rest of us less safe”). 
 87. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 795 (citing Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. 
v. Anderson, No. 1:08-CV-11364(GAO), 2008 WL 6954925 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 
2009)) (“Some vendors have attempted to argue that the act of publicly 
disclosing a vulnerability or exploit is a violation of computer crime law, but no 
court has officially ruled on this question. In 2008, the [MBTA] sued three MIT 
students to prevent them from giving a presentation at a conference that 
included information about a vulnerability in MBTA’s ticketing system. The 
court denied MBT’’s request for a preliminary injunction and remarked that it 
was unlikely that MBTA’s claim would succeed on the merits.”). 
 88. Brief of Amici Curiae Computer Science Professors and Computer 
Scientists, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 1:08-CV-11364(GAO), 
2008 WL 6954925 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 89. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the U.S. Attorneys and 
Assistant Attorney Gens. for the Criminal and Nat’l Sec. Div., Intake and 
Charging Policy for Computer Crime Matters (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www 
.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/904941/download [hereinafter Attorney General 
Memorandum]. 
 90. Jenna McLaughlin, Justice Department Releases Guidelines on 
Controversial Anti-Hacking Law, INTERCEPT (Oct. 26, 2016, 11:30 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/10/26/justice-department-releases-guidelines-on-
controversial-anti-hacking-law/. The importance of these “pillars” is also 
reflected in the existence of the 16 “Sector Coordinating Councils”—
information-sharing organizations with the goal of protecting critical sectors of 
the American economy who receive high-clearance security information from 
the U.S. government, from the private sector, and from each other. See Sector 
Coordinating Councils, DHS (July 11, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/scc. 
 91. Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 39, 60–
71 (2011) (describing a vast array of crimes committed through the use of 
computers). 
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general definition of involuntary manslaughter,92 
unintentionally causing the death of an individual while 
accessing any digital platform without authorization (which is 
the core of conduct criminalized by the CFAA, even though other 
elements beyond unauthorized access are necessary to proving a 
crime) may be prosecutable as involuntary manslaughter. This 
is somewhat comparable to law which existed before the digital 
era: involuntary manslaughter has been found in the context of 
a duty to safeguard.93 While no one as yet appears to have died 
directly due to malware or similar attacks, such a death may be 
an inevitability given the frequency of attacks on healthcare 
systems.94 The DOJ CFAA guidelines mentioned above clearly 
indicate that threats to public health are priorities for CFAA 
prosecution,95 so the government may be eager to try a test case. 
Much writing on the CFAA has focused on the idea that, as 
a fairly broad statute, it over-criminalizes behavior which, while 
perhaps not innocuous, should also not be criminal.96 Proponents 
                                                          
 92. E.g., 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 127 (2018) (“Involuntary manslaughter is 
committed when a person, while engaged in an unlawful act, unintentionally 
causes the death of another or where a person engaged in a lawful act unlawfully 
causes the death of another.”) (emphasis added). 
 93.  
Defendant asserts that insufficient evidence was presented to support 
her involuntary manslaughter conviction based on her failure to 
perform a legal duty as there is no specific legal duty to “safeguard, 
control and prevent the discFharge of a loaded firearm.” We disagree. 
This conclusion is based on testimony that defendant had a loaded 
gun in her hand as she tried to let herself in the house, that the victim 
was only a few feet away from defendant, and that the gun somehow 
fired, hitting the victim in the face. Sufficient evidence was presented 
so that the jury could have inferred that it would be apparent to the 
ordinary mind that failure to perform a legal duty to safeguard, control 
and protect the loaded gun was likely to prove disastrous to the victim. 
People v. Weaks, No. 183697, 1996 WL 33357539 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 
1996). 
 94. Jesse M. Ehrenfeld, WannaCry, Cybersecurity and Health Information 
Technology: A Time to Act, 41 J. MED. SYS. 104, 104 (2017); see also Filip Truta, 
New Ransomware Attack Forces Hospitals to Turn Away Patients, HOT FOR SEC. 
(Jan. 25, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://hotforsecurity.bitdefender.com/blog/new-
ransomware-attack-forces-hospitals-to-turn-away-patients-19490.html 
(describing how some hospitals are refusing to treat patients because their 
electronic health records system were shut down by ransomware). 
 95. Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 89. 
 96.  
The government’s construction . . . . [makes] criminals of large groups 
of people who would have little reason to suspect they are committing a 
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of the CFAA often point to prosecutorial discretion as a solution 
to this problem,97 but detractors in turn point to cases where 
prosecutors arguably overstepped.98 Additionally, since the 
CFAA created a private right of action,99 prosecutorial discretion 
simply has no role in many cases. For this reason, the rule of 
lenity100 has been invoked in the context of the CFAA,101 but has 
had little to no actual effect in narrowing the breadth with which 
the statute is interpreted.102 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. HOW WELL WOULD ANY OF THESE APPROACHES ACTUALLY 
WORK? 
Each of the above approaches to assigning responsibility in 
the context of vulnerability disclosure has worth, but some are 
likely to have more of a positive impact than others. The 
adoption of a negligence framework is perhaps one of the more 
likely scenarios for further control of vulnerability disclosure, as 
                                                          
federal crime . . . . Basing criminal liability on violations of private 
computer use polices can transform whole categories of otherwise 
innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply because a computer is 
involved. 
United States v. Nosal (Nosal I), 676 F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled 
by United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
the CFAA applies to misappropriation); Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in 
Technology, NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news 
/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology (“The Justice Department’s 
interpretation [of the CFAA] makes the American desk-worker a felon.”). 
 97. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 862 (“The government assures us that, whatever 
the scope of the CFAA, it won’t prosecute minor violations.”). 
 98. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)) (“The 
government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it won’t prosecute 
minor violations. But we shouldn’t have to live at the mercy of our local 
prosecutor . . . ’ We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely 
because the government promised to use it responsibly.’”); MCGEVERAN, supra 
note 85, at 473 (“[T]here certainly are examples where federal prosecutors used 
CFAA charges to go after persons who may have been in their sights 
notwithstanding any hacking allegations.”). 
 99. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012). 
 100. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 863 (quoting United States v. Witberger, 18 U.S. 
76, 95 (1820)) (“The rule of lenity requires ‘penal laws . . . to be construed 
strictly.’”). 
 101. E.g., id. 
 102. E.g., United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024, 1035 n.6 
(declining to apply the rule of lenity due to a perceived lack of ambiguity in the 
CFAA, despite acknowledging a narrower interpretation of the CFAA exists). 
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negligence is an extraordinarily wide-ranging concept which has 
been adapted to virtually every corner of modern American 
life.103 Data breach litigation, for example, is a growing field of 
negligence actions against companies holding consumer data.104 
Malware researchers are already sued or threatened with 
litigation somewhat frequently,105 and expanding negligence to 
encompass allegedly improper vulnerability disclosure runs the 
risk of chilling the enthusiasm of security researchers to 
research and disclose vulnerabilities,106 and of pushing them 
towards anonymous or black market disclosures.107 
Negligence actions are an attractive proposition for dealing 
with the problem of improper disclosure because courts are very 
aware of how negligence works and an entirely new framework 
may prove to be more confusing than an approach which merely 
introduced new duties, or new ways to breach existing duties, to 
the existing negligence framework. Adopting this framework 
would give courts a straightforward means of treating malware 
researchers as professionals who have adopted a set of 
professional standards. Even though the development and 
adjustment of those standards is—and will continue to be—
difficult, professional organizations and other groups with 
                                                          
 103. HENDERSON, PEARSON & KYSAR, supra note 48, at 159. 
 104. See, e.g., In re The Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach 
Litig., MDL Docket No. 2583, 2016 WL 2897520, at *3–5 (N.D. Ga. 2016) 
(discussing negligence law in the context of a data breach); In re Premera Blue 
Cross Customer Data Security Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (D. Or. 2016). 
 105. Legal Threats Against Security Researchers, ATTRITION, 
http://attrition.org/errata/legal_threats/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (providing 
summaries of recent legal action against security researchers, and strongly 
advocating that most such actions are baseless attempts to save face). 
 106. Malena Carollo, Influencers: Lawsuits to Prevent Reporting 
Vulnerabilities Will Chill Research, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR: PASSCODE (Sept. 
29, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Influencers 
/2015/0929/Influencers-Lawsuits-to-prevent-reporting-vulnerabilities-will-
chill-research. 
 107. See Zack Whittaker, Lawsuits Threaten Infosec Research—Just When 
We Need It Most, ZDNET (Feb. 19, 2018, 5:00 PM), http://www.zdnet.com 
/article/chilling-effect-lawsuits-threaten-security-research-need-it-most/ (“One 
independent researcher, who asked not to be named, said that they will ‘simply 
post details of a flaw anonymously online’ [due to fear of litigation].”); see also 
Carollo, supra note 106 (“‘Numerous researchers have either stopped looking 
for bugs, or worse, have stopped reporting them. The bugs are still there, 
possibly being used by the bad guys, but fear of prosecution, for what amounts 
to telling the truth, stops many researchers from reporting bugs.’”). 
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expertise are better at this work than courts are,108 and courts 
will benefit from the input of these groups every time an expert 
witness testifies at trial. Medical malpractice cases already 
delegate this responsibility to expert witnesses: “The 
overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that 
ordinarily expert evidence is essential to support an action for 
malpractice against a physician or surgeon.”109 Allowing expert 
witnesses and professional organizations to set the standards of 
malware research could decrease the work required by courts 
and would likely result in law which better reflects the 
professional standards actually adopted by industry. Other 
elements of negligence, such as causation, are also highly likely 
to require expert testimony in technologically complex cases.110 
On the other hand, negligence actions may not be the best 
way to handle vulnerability disclosure, simply because malware 
researchers typically have fewer financial resources and less in-
house legal capacity compared to the companies whose products 
they research.111 This asymmetry means some tech companies 
may bully well-meaning and responsible researchers into silence 
through threats of meritless litigation. Recourse does exist in 
other areas of the law for defendants of meritless litigation, such 
as fee-shifting measures112 and anti-SLAPP laws,113 but even if 
                                                          
 108. Many organizations are already engaged in crafting similar systems of 
voluntary standards. See, e.g., NAT’L. INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 
50; 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (2012). But see Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 776 
(“Some critics question the wisdom of even voluntary cybersecurity standards, 
due to the risk that companies will adopt the bare minimum required to comply. 
Providing a higher baseline than what might have existed before is valuable, 
but the danger comes when agencies mistake practices that are necessary to 
improve security, and practices that are sufficient to improve security.”). 
 109. H. H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Evidence to Support an 
Action for Malpractice Against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R. 2d 597 Art. 1, 
§ 2 (1962). 
 110. Causation in particular has played a large role in other cybersecurity 
cases. E.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(Pryor, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiffs alleged only correlation, rather 
than causation). 
 111. See, e.g., Whittaker, supra note 107 (documenting the chilling effect of 
legal threats on security researchers). 
 112. See Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 70–
74 (2016) (discussing cost asymmetry in litigation, as well as fee-shifting laws 
and other means of accounting for cost asymmetry). 
 113. For a discussion of Anti-SLAPP statutes in general, and for a discussion 
of California’s Anti-SLAPP statute in particular, see Brian D. Shaffer, 
California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Potent, Yet Confounding, Weapon, 27 
MILLER & STARR REAL EST. NEWSALERT 589 (2017). 
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a cybersecurity law expressly applied such recourse to the 
vulnerability disclosure context, securing such recourse would 
itself require an investment, which small companies or 
individuals may not be able to afford.114 Taking into account, as 
noted above, that some tech companies have already sued 
malware researchers in what may be attempts to silence 
criticism of their products,115 the expansion of negligence to 
encompass allegedly improper vulnerability disclosure may be 
unwise, since it provides additional grounds for litigation which 
may be baseless. Finally, encouraging negligence actions as the 
primary means for addressing improper vulnerability disclosure 
may have a negative impact on the development of the law, 
simply because the development of case law is typically a long 
process.116 While courts develop the case law on improper 
vulnerability disclosure over what may be decades, the industry 
may be left with frustrating uncertainty as to what the rules 
actually are. 
Adopting a strict liability analysis of vulnerability 
disclosure may be an appealing alternative to general 
negligence, but if it were to be adopted, it should be greatly 
constrained to a miniscule subset of vulnerability disclosure 
which is truly “abnormally dangerous.”117 The Restatement 
definition of “abnormally dangerous” is confined to uncommon 
activities which “[create] a foreseeable and highly significant 
risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by 
all actors.”118 In applying this definition to vulnerability 
disclosure, it’s important to keep in mind that most vulnerability 
research is probably not uncommon in the sense necessary to 
                                                          
 114. For an in-depth analysis of the cost and process of fighting malicious or 
frivolous lawsuits in states both with and without anti-SLAPP legislation, see 
Ken White, Why, Yes, I AM Into SLAPPing, POPEHAT (June 7, 2012), 
https://www.popehat.com/2012/06/07/why-yes-i-am-into-slapping/. 
 115. Legal Threats Against Security Researchers, supra note 105. 
 116. See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless 
World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2007) (noting that between Warren and 
Brandeis’s conception of the privacy torts and Dean Prosser’s solidification of 
them, 70 years passed). 
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Notably, there are other activities in addition 
to those that are “abnormally dangerous” in which strict liability can be applied 
to a certain situation, including, for example, possessing exotic or dangerous 
pets. Id. §§ 22–23. 
 118. Id. § 20. 
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meet this definition.119 Additionally, the requirement of 
“physical harm” probably forecloses the vast majority of these 
cases, since any harm caused by improper disclosure is 
overwhelmingly unlikely to be physical. Third, “reasonable 
care,” properly defined, is likely to foreclose the possibility of 
significant harm. 
Because it may not be intuitive that reasonable care has 
that effect, an example may be provided by examining the 
Shadow Brokers leak discussed at the beginning of this Note.120 
Shadow Brokers disclosed massive amounts of information 
about zero-day exploits and other cyberweapons, including 
EternalBlue, to the public without first contacting Microsoft, the 
NSA, or any other parties.121 This is clearly a violation of 
reasonable care, because reasonable security researchers 
generally don’t do any of the following: A) break into and steal 
information from government databases,122 B) publicly release 
volatile information without contacting vendors or other 
impacted parties (in this case, Microsoft) to mitigate the harm 
which could follow such a release,123 or C) fail to redact or delay 
such information in any manner.124 Shadow Brokers involved 
themselves in incredibly dangerous activities which resulted in 
massive consequences, but those activities were dangerous 
because Shadow Brokers failed to exercise reasonable care, 
rather than despite their exercise of reasonable care. A likelihood 
of serious consequences despite reasonable care is the linchpin of 
                                                          
 119. This is a somewhat complex question to analyze but consider one 
metric: approximately 80,000 Americans hold Certified Information Systems 
Security Professional (CISSP) qualifications. This common information security 
certificate requires expertise comparable to the level of expertise needed to 
carry out vulnerability research. (ISC)2 Member Counts, (ISC)2 (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://www.isc2.org/About/Member-Counts. 
 120. Goodin, supra note 6. 
 121. Id. 
 122. This behavior is clearly delineated as unreasonable by both the letter 
and the spirit of the CFAA. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(b) (2012). To clarify—”break 
into” implies a lack of authorization or some practice that goes beyond existing 
system authorization, even though authorization in a different sense may exist 
for this behavior given other facts. For instance, a penetration testing company 
could secure authorization to attempt to break into the DOJ’s computer system 
without violating the CFAA. 
 123. Existing norms and existing Responsible Disclosure policies render this 
unreasonable. See, e.g., Bonderud, supra note 63. 
 124. This is also rendered unreasonable by Responsible Disclosure norms 
and policies. See, e.g., id. 
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strict liability,125 and because a reasonable standard of care in 
cybersecurity can go a long way to prevent serious consequences, 
strict liability will typically be an inappropriate analysis in the 
context of vulnerability disclosure.126 
One specific facet of Shadow Brokers is perhaps more 
interesting than others in the context of strict liability: Shadow 
Brokers stole a stockpile of information and cyberweapons from 
the NSA, and they released that information in large “dumps,” 
which can fairly be regarded simply as public stockpiles.127 Some 
groups, including Microsoft128 and advisory entities within the 
Obama Administration,129 have questioned the general concept 
of stockpiles, and have argued a point similar to a strict liability 
analysis—cyber-weapons stockpiles are dangerous things, even 
when great care is exercised.130 Some entities in the research 
community have pushed back on the criticism of stockpiles. 
Malpedia is one example of a fairly large stockpile of malware, 
much of it unpatched and dangerous, which is maintained and 
used for research purposes.131 Malpedia is “operated as an 
invite-only trust group”—meaning access to the stockpile is 
limited to researchers known to its operator as trustworthy.132 
Assuming that a duty exists to responsibly limit access to 
dangerous cyberweapons only to those parties who would not 
reasonably be expected to use the information maliciously, 
Malpedia fulfills that duty better than Shadow Brokers, who did 
                                                          
 125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 126. Creating a hypothetical in which strict liability would be appropriate is 
difficult, but one example of the rare scenarios in which strict liability would be 
the appropriate analysis follows: imagine a penetration testing company, hired 
to test the security and operability of systems which regulate a running nuclear 
reactor (assume that it is not possible to test the programs while the reactor has 
been safely shut down). Even with the highest conceivable standard of care, this 
test is absolutely an abnormally dangerous activity, because even though the 
risk is low, successful penetration could have catastrophic consequences if some 
critical system function was altered because of the testing. 
 127. Goodin, supra note 6. 
 128. Smith, supra note 10. 
 129. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS 
TECHS., supra note 18; see also Brandom, supra note 18. 
 130. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS 
TECHS., supra note 18. 
 131. Malpedia, FRAUNHOFER FKIE, https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer 
.de/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
 132. Malpedia Terms of Service, FRAUNHOFER FKIE, https://malpedia 
.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/terms_of_service (last visited Apr. 16, 2018). 
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not restrict access to their dump at all. However, Malpedia’s 
security infrastructure is almost certainly weaker than the 
NSA’s—and as Shadow Brokers made all too clear, even the NSA 
is not invulnerable.133 
Criminal law will likely remain relevant in this area. 
Despite substantial criticism of the CFAA,134 the DOJ has 
released memoranda which appear to indicate that CFAA 
prosecutions will continue.135 Specifically, the most recent 
memorandum indicates that the DOJ is interested in trying a 
CFAA case in which a risk of bodily harm existed.136 In the 
context of recent threats to hospital and healthcare systems,137 
this may indicate that the DOJ would be willing to try a case in 
which, for instance, ransomware shut down a system which was 
directly responsible for sustaining a patient’s life. 
Despite this sustained enthusiasm on the part of the DOJ,138 
a scenario in which the CFAA is either replaced or heavily 
amended is likely to be much more palatable to many scholars.139 
Kirsch argues that “all hacking is essentially illegal under the 
[CFAA],” that “the CFAA has become so broad that the law now 
‘threatens to swallow the Internet,’” and that “the broad 
language of the CFAA is a result of out-dated Internet 
philosophies from before the Internet’s omnipresence in 
society.”140 The central problem with the CFAA is likely that the 
concept of “unauthorized access” is immensely broad and 
nebulous,141 which may lend itself to excessive prosecutorial 
discretion.142 In order to address these problems, a new and 
                                                          
 133. Goodin, supra note 6; see also Smith, supra note 10. 
 134. See McLaughlin, supra note 90. 
 135. Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 89. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Ehrenfeld, supra note 94; Truta, supra note 94. 
 138. This enthusiasm may not always be shared by the companies on whose 
behalf the DOJ brings criminal charges. See Kerr, supra note 58, at 1170 (“It is 
telling that when the government has pursued aggressive criminal charges 
under the CFAA for use of websites, it has often been without the support of the 
companies claimed as victims.”). 
 139. See McLaughlin, supra note 90; see also Kerr, supra note 58. 
 140. Kirsch, supra note 80, at 392–93. 
 141. Fidler, supra note 19, at 68, (“The CFAA has been criticized for its 
‘breadth and severity.’ The law has increasingly been used to prosecute 
offenses . . . one might not consider classical hacking.”). 
 142. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 771 (“[S]ome question the 
government’s enforcement patterns. A majority of referred CFAA cases are left 
unprosecuted due to lack of evidence, while CFAA prosecutions that do go 
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modern cybercrime law could adopt language substantially 
different from “unauthorized access” to describe criminal usage 
of a computer, language could be added to the CFAA through 
amendment or judicial interpretation which clearly delineates 
what “unauthorized access” means, or the DOJ could work with 
industry groups to discuss possible amendments to the 
prosecutorial guidelines, aimed at criminalizing only 
detrimental “unauthorized access.”143 The modern world is one 
in which certain kinds of hacking should be perfectly legal. The 
CFAA needs to be reinterpreted or amended in order to better 
reflect that view, and until it is, criminal law in the area of 
cybersecurity will be significantly outdated.144 
Other possible approaches do exist, including Kesan & 
Hayes’ market approach145 and the Dual-Use Research of 
Concern (DURC) approach used in biohazard research and in the 
Wassenaar Agreement.146 The market approach is probably 
unhelpful, if only because it may pose another barrier to entry 
into tech—an industry which depends heavily on startups. Bugs 
are common in all software, and many start-ups would have an 
incredibly difficult time justifying to investors a seven-figure 
budget for buying all the bugs in their software. DURC is also 
                                                          
forward sometimes play fast and loose with what it means to access a computer 
without authorization . . . . [I]nconsistent applications of [CFAA] threaten to 
discourage benevolent security research while encouraging the actions of 
malicious hackers who know that their odds of being caught and prosecuted are 
slim.”). 
 143. One polarizing issue on this final point may be the prosecution and 
subsequent suicide of Aaron Swartz, an internet activist who was charged under 
the CFAA after he downloaded several million academic journals articles. 
McLaughlin, supra note 90; Larissa MacFarquhar, Requiem for a Dream, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/11 
/requiem-for-a-dream. Discussions about Swartz illustrate the human cost of 
uncertainty regarding the bounds of the CFAA. 
 144. See Kirsch, supra note 80, at 392–93 (arguing the CFAA is outdated); 
Orin Kerr, Obama’s Proposed Changes to the Computer Hacking Statute: A Deep 
Dive, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/14 
/obamas-proposed-changes-to-the-computer-hacking-statute-a-deep-
dive/?utm_term=.905180db351b (“The law is a mess, yes. And there are some 
frightening readings of the law that courts might adopt under the current 
text . . . [but] I’m relatively optimistic that the narrower readings will prevail if 
and when the Supreme Court turns to the CFAA.”). 
 145. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 817–29. 
 146. See Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42, at 2–4 (discussing DURC in 
biohazard research); Fidler, supra note 19, at 135 (discussing the Wassenaar 
Agreement). 
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probably inappropriate, for three reasons: A) no analogous 
oversight mechanism to the NIH exists in information security, 
even though some systems like NIST do provide voluntary 
standards, B) DURC in the biotechnology field functions largely 
through threats of removing federal funding,147 threats which 
cannot be applied to private tech companies and private 
malware researchers, and C) a dual-use analysis was already 
attempted in the context of vulnerabilities with the Wassenaar 
Agreement, which has gone essentially nowhere.148 
B. WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD ULTIMATELY ATTACH TO 
VULNERABILITY RESEARCHERS AND ADJACENT INDUSTRIES? 
Industry groups and other stakeholders are likely the most 
qualified individuals to discuss the specific duties incumbent on 
malware researchers. With that in mind, Responsible 
Disclosure149 is likely the standard which has the most support 
of individuals and organizations in the information security 
industry.150 Responsible Disclosure is also desirable because it 
would integrate well with common law negligence, since 
authorship on Responsible Disclosure tends to clearly delineate 
the respective duties of security researchers and companies.151 
Through adopting the considered analysis and thought of many 
information security scholars, courts are likely to come to a much 
more accurate conception of the standard of care owed by 
vulnerability researchers. Responsible Disclosure has 
historically had some problems with providing an appropriate 
incentive to malware researchers, especially when compared to 
the black market,152 so other means of encouraging Responsible 
Disclosure should be developed. These might include federal 
subsidies or tax incentives for bug bounties, immunity from 
related IP infringement or CFAA cases,153 or other incentives. 
                                                          
 147. Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42, at 3. 
 148. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 777. 
 149. See Bonderud, supra note 63. 
 150. Google Security Team, supra note 31. 
 151. See, e.g., id. 
 152. See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 761. 
 153. See, e.g., id. at 803 (citing Derek E. Bambaeur & Oliver Day, The 
Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1086 (2011)) (“Bambauer and Day, for 
example, recommend granting researchers immunity from intellectual property 
litigation if they follow a responsible disclosure model.”). 
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Even if Responsible Disclosure were to be adopted, it only 
covers so much ground, and leaves many questions 
unanswered—for instance, what level of access restriction 
should we consider “responsible” when managing a stockpile of 
cyberweapons? Shadow Brokers is certainly irresponsible in 
their total lack of restriction, but is Malpedia154 irresponsible 
because they operate a stockpile of unpatched malware despite 
lacking resources comparable to a branch of the largest military 
on the planet?155 Is the NSA irresponsible because their security 
was breached despite presumably using those resources wisely? 
Ideally, the answers to these questions would correspond to a 
sliding scale, in which the level of requisite protection 
corresponds to the apparent danger posed by the material 
stockpiled. This is somewhat a common sense approach: most 
people would consider someone a responsible weapon custodian 
if she locked a gun in a well-built safe, but not if she locked a 
nuclear weapon in the same safe. 
Confusingly, however, analyses using such a sliding scale 
may conclude that Malpedia responsibly protects their stockpile 
while the NSA did not, even if the NSA had invested more in 
security infrastructure and created an environment which was 
overall much more secure than Malpedia’s. Additionally, a 
sliding scale approach may create difficulties when a particular 
piece of malware poses an uncertain danger. If a security 
researcher quarantines a suspicious file from a spam e-mail and 
uploads it to a service like Malpedia for further research without 
realizing that the file contains a highly engineered cyberweapon 
utilizing a handful of kernel-level zero-day exploits in Windows, 
that security researcher may have unwittingly catapulted the 
service’s obligation to restrict access to a much higher level (if 
the sliding scale proposed depends only on what the service 
actually holds, rather than on what they know—constructively 
or otherwise—they hold). In such a situation, the sliding scale 
rule would a) likely fail to provide adequate limits on access to 
the malware, and simultaneously b) unfairly impose an 
extremely high obligation on an unwitting service, despite that 
service’s reasonable belief that they were fulfilling their security 
obligations. The latter may be “solved” by adapting the rule to 
                                                          
 154. Malpedia, supra note 131. 
 155. What We Do: Support to the Military, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (May 3, 2016), 
https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/support-the-military/ (“The National Security 
Agency is part of the U.S. Department of Defense.”). 
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adjust protection in accordance with the service’s reasonable 
expectation of the danger imposed by their stockpile, but such a 
change would probably fail to inspire any sense of certainty. As 
to the former, there is probably no satisfying solution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Shadow Brokers and groups like them, who carelessly 
disclose the practical equivalent of a weapon to the public at 
large without sufficient care, must be held responsible for their 
carelessness. As discussed above, this is possible under a variety 
of approaches. The CFAA provides a great deal of power and 
discretion to prosecutors, for example, but such discretion may 
be misapplied in less clear-cut cases. Because of the uncertainty 
in the CFAA’s application, civil actions such as negligence are a 
better way to address alleged wrongs in the context of 
vulnerability disclosure, especially when industry experts are 
allowed to testify as to critical aspects of the case, such as duty. 
Responsible Disclosure and similar doctrines could be 
determinative in such cases. These doctrines can gain legal 
weight two ways. First, they may be incorporated into the 
common law through inclusion in judicial opinions after trials at 
which expert witnesses testified. Second, states or the U.S. 
Government may pass statutes requiring researchers to meet 
Responsible Disclosure standards, which would thereby render 
non-compliant researchers per se negligent. Widespread 
adoption of industry standards like Responsible Disclosure, 
coupled with allowance for continued industry input to courts 
and other decision-makers regarding updates to those 
standards, is in the best interest of everyone involved in 
vulnerability disclosure. 
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